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SIM Swap Attack: What to Do If Your Phone Number Is Hijacked

Your phone suddenly shows No Service and codes stop arriving. How SIM swaps and port-outs work, the order to take your number back, and the carrier locks that stop it.

A SIM swap takes your phone number away from your phone. The attacker gets your mobile carrier to move the number onto a SIM card or eSIM they hold, and from that moment your calls and text messages, including every one-time code and password-reset text, go to them. They do not need your handset, your passcode or any malware. The number is the target, because so many accounts treat whoever holds it as you.

This guide covers the number takeover itself: how to tell it is happening, how attackers pull it off, the order to win the number back and contain the accounts behind it, and the carrier settings that stop it happening again. If your handset was physically stolen, start with what to do when your phone is stolen, which covers locking and erasing the device. If you find loans, cards or phone lines opened in your name afterwards, that is identity theft, and the identity theft recovery checklist covers credit freezes and official reports.

Signs your number has been hijacked

The swap itself is quiet. You may notice one or more of these:

SignWhat it usually means
Phone shows No Service, SOS only or SIM not recognised, while people near you have signalYour SIM or eSIM was deactivated because the number now lives on another SIM
Text or email from your carrier about a SIM change, eSIM activation, new device or number transfer you did not requestThe change went through, or someone is trying it now
Calls go to voicemail and texts stop, but Wi-Fi apps still workNormal on a swapped line: Wi-Fi data does not depend on the SIM
Login codes you request never arriveThey are going to the attacker's SIM
Emails about password changes, new sign-ins or removed 2FA on your email, bank or exchange accountsThe attacker is already using the number
Friends say they got odd messages or calls "from you"The attacker is using your accounts or number to target contacts

A dead signal alone can be an outage or a faulty SIM. A dead signal plus a carrier notice you did not trigger, or plus password-reset emails, should be treated as a SIM swap until the carrier tells you otherwise. Act promptly to limit what can be reset through the number.

How attackers move your number

There are four common routes. They all end the same way, with your number on hardware the attacker controls.

1. Social engineering the carrier. The attacker calls customer support or walks into a store pretending to be you, says the phone was lost or broken, and asks for a new SIM on the number. Your name, address, date of birth and the last digits of an ID number are often available from data breaches. The FCC adopted rules in 2023 that would stop US carriers relying on that kind of readily available information to authenticate a SIM change, but compliance is still deferred (see the law section below). In the January 2024 takeover of the US Securities and Exchange Commission's X account, prosecutors said the attacker printed a fake ID with the victim's details and used it in an AT&T store in Alabama to have the number moved to a new SIM. He received the X password reset codes on the new phone, photographed one and shared it with co-conspirators, one of whom used it to get into the account and post a false announcement that the SEC had approved bitcoin ETFs.

2. Bribing an insider. Some swaps are done by a carrier or retail store employee who is paid to push the change through. In April 2024 T-Mobile and Verizon employees reported unsolicited text messages offering $300 per SIM swap, with instructions to make contact over Telegram. The FBI lists insider threats alongside social engineering and phishing as the methods behind these schemes.

3. Port-out fraud. Instead of a new SIM at your carrier, the attacker opens an account at a different carrier and asks to transfer ("port") your number there. Porting requirements vary by country and carrier, but they usually rest on account details and a transfer PIN, which an attacker can get by breaking into your online carrier account or by talking support into issuing one. Your carrier never issues a new SIM, so its SIM change protections do not apply.

4. eSIM transfer through your online account. If the attacker has your carrier account password (reused from a breach, phished or guessed), they may not need to talk to anyone. In March 2024 researchers at the security firm F.A.C.C.T. reported attackers logging in to victims' mobile carrier accounts and generating an eSIM QR code that moved the number onto a device they held. Self-service eSIM activation is convenient for you and equally convenient for anyone with your carrier login.

Why your number is worth stealing

A phone number is valuable because services use it for three different jobs:

  • SMS one-time codes for two-factor sign-in.
  • Password reset, where a code to the number is enough to set a new password. This is the dangerous one, because it skips the password entirely.
  • Identity, for messaging apps such as WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram that register you by number.

In September 2023, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin's X account was taken over after an attacker socially engineered T-Mobile into moving his number. Buterin said afterwards that he had not realised a phone number was enough to reset an X password even when it was not being used for 2FA. The account then promoted a fake NFT giveaway whose link led followers to a wallet drainer.

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center logged 1,611 SIM swap complaints in 2021 with adjusted losses over $68 million, against 320 complaints and about $12 million for the whole of 2018 to 2020. In the UK, Cifas reported nearly 3,000 unauthorised SIM swap cases filed to its National Fraud Database in 2024, which it described as a 1,055% rise on 2023.

What to do: the first hour

Do this from another phone, a laptop or a friend's device. Your own phone no longer receives calls or texts on that number. Steps 2 and 3 do not wait for step 1 to finish: a port-out in particular can take hours or days to reverse, and the attacker can use the number the whole time.

OrderActionWhat it does
1Call your carrier's fraud lineStarts containment of the unauthorised SIM or port, and recovery of the number
2Secure your primary emailCuts off password resets for everything else
3Banks, payment apps and crypto exchangesStops transfers and withdrawals
4Number back, carrier account lockedPrevents a second swap
5Messaging apps and social accountsStops impersonation of you to your contacts
6Report itCreates the record banks and police ask for

If you can see money moving, or you cannot tell, call your bank straight after the carrier and do email second.

Step 1: Call the carrier from another phone

Use the fraud or security number on the carrier's website, and say clearly that your number was moved to another SIM (or ported out) without your permission. Verizon, for example, says you can dial *611 from a Verizon phone or use its toll-free number from any phone. Ask the agent to:

  1. Disable the unauthorised SIM or eSIM now, before anything else, so codes stop reaching the attacker.
  2. Confirm what changed and when: a SIM change, an eSIM activation or a port-out. The time matters for your bank and for the police.
  3. Restore the number to your SIM or issue you a new one. Expect an identity check, sometimes in a store with photo ID. That check is what protects you, so allow for it.
  4. For a port-out, ask your carrier's fraud or porting team to reverse the unauthorised port and coordinate with the carrier that received it. Follow their instructions; do not start a separate transfer yourself.
  5. Write down the case number, the agent's name and the time of the call.

If you cannot get through on the phone, go to one of your carrier's stores with photo ID.

Step 2: Secure your primary email

Your primary email account receives most "forgot password" links, so it decides how far the attacker gets. Verizon's own advice after an unauthorised port is to change your email and online banking passwords immediately. From a trusted computer:

  • Change the password and sign out every other session.
  • Check every way into the account: recovery phone, recovery email, passkeys, security keys, authenticator apps and connected third-party apps. Attackers often add their own. Remove anything you do not recognise.
  • Delete forwarding rules and filters you did not create.

If the attacker has already locked you out, start the provider's account recovery now. The hacked account recovery guide walks through Google, Microsoft and Apple recovery and the full cleanup checklist.

Step 3: Banks, payment apps and crypto exchanges

Call each bank's fraud line and say your number was hijacked. Ask them to check for new payees, changed contact details and recent transfers, and to flag the account so that changes to your phone number or email need extra checks.

Crypto exchanges deserve particular speed, because withdrawals are fast and usually final. Log in from a trusted device, change the password, check the withdrawal address allowlist and API keys, and contact support to freeze withdrawals if you see anything you did not do. Our guide to crypto exchange account security covers what to lock down.

Illustrated cybersecurity scene for SIM Swap Attack: What to Do If Your Phone Number Is Hijacked
Illustration for SIM Swap Attack: What to Do If Your Phone Number Is Hijacked.

In Malaysia: if money has left your account through online fraud, call the National Scam Response Centre on 997 as well as your bank. The government lists the hotline as running 24 hours. Bank Negara Malaysia told banks in September 2022 to migrate from SMS one-time passwords to more secure authentication for online banking and to limit customers to one registered device for approving transactions, so most Malaysian banks now approve transactions in their app. Check that the registered device is still yours.

Step 4: Get the number back and lock the carrier account

When the carrier confirms the number is back on your SIM, test it with a call and a text, then close the door that opened it:

  • Change the carrier account password to a unique one, and turn on the strongest sign-in protection the carrier offers.
  • Set or change the account PIN or passcode that support asks for. Do not reuse your bank PIN, your birthday or the last four digits of an ID number.
  • Turn on the SIM change lock and the number transfer lock if your carrier has them (see the table in the prevention section for US carriers).
  • Ask for a note on the account that you were a SIM swap victim, and ask what extra checks they can apply to future SIM changes.
  • Request the carrier's record of the fraudulent change. Banks and police may ask for it.

Step 5: Messaging apps and social accounts

Messaging apps that sign in by phone number can be re-registered by whoever holds the number. Once the number is back, check whether you are still signed in. If you were pushed out, re-register with the SMS code and turn on the app's PIN protection straight away. Two details catch people out:

  • WhatsApp logs everyone else out of the account as soon as you enter the six-digit SMS code. If it then asks for a two-step verification PIN you never set, the attacker set it; WhatsApp says to wait 7 days and try again.
  • Signal Registration Lock expires after 7 days of inactivity on the account, so it protects you for a short window only if your own device stays active.

Then review linked devices and active sessions in each app and remove any you do not recognise. For X, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok and similar accounts, check whether the email, phone or 2FA settings were changed, use the platform's hacked-account form if you are locked out, and warn your contacts on another channel to ignore requests for money or codes.

Step 6: Report it

  • The police, with the carrier case number and the times. Some banks ask for a report number before they investigate.
  • In the US, the FBI's IC3 at ic3.gov, which is where the FBI asks SIM swap victims to report.
  • In Malaysia, NSRC 997 for losses through online fraud, then a police report.

If the attacker also opened accounts or credit in your name, follow the identity theft recovery checklist for credit freezes and identity theft reports.

After the incident: take the number out of your security

Getting the number back stops new codes reaching the attacker. The accounts behind it stay exposed for as long as they trust SMS. Work through your important accounts, starting with email, then banks and exchanges, then your Apple Account or Google Account, and change two things on each:

1. Replace SMS 2FA with the strongest method the service supports: a passkey or hardware security key where offered, an authenticator app otherwise. Moving your number does nothing to any of these. The two-factor authentication guide ranks the methods and the passkeys guide explains setup.

2. Remove the phone number as a recovery option wherever the service lets you, once you have another way in. Buterin's case shows why: a number used only for recovery is still a way to reset the password. Replace it with backup codes stored offline, a second security key, or a recovery email that is itself well protected. Some services, including many banks, will not let you remove the number; there, set every other protection they offer.

Sign-in or recovery methodStill works for the attacker after a SIM swap?
SMS code or voice call codeYes
Phone number as password reset or backupYes
Authenticator app (TOTP)No
Push approval in an app on your deviceNo
Passkey or hardware security keyNo

These rows describe the method alone. An account with a passkey is still exposed if it also keeps SMS as a fallback, or if the account that syncs your passkeys or authenticator codes is itself recovered by SMS.

Prevention: set this up today

Set these before anything happens, and review them again after you recover from a swap. The carrier settings cost nothing extra at the major US carriers.

  1. Set a carrier account PIN or passcode and make it unique. Ask your carrier which PIN support uses for SIM changes and which one is used for number transfers; some carriers have two.
  2. Turn on SIM and port-out locks. Major US carriers offer them, and you have to switch them on:
CarrierSIM change protectionNumber transfer protection
AT&TWireless Account Lock (one switch covers both)Wireless Account Lock
VerizonSIM ProtectionNumber Lock
T-MobileSIM ProtectionPort Out Protection

Elsewhere, ask your carrier whether it can block SIM replacements and number transfers unless you appear in person with ID.

  1. Protect the carrier account itself with a unique password and the strongest sign-in method it supports, because an attacker inside the online account can order an eSIM or generate a transfer PIN.
  2. Set a SIM PIN on the SIM card in your phone. It protects against physical theft of the SIM; the stolen phone guide has the steps.
  3. Take SMS and phone-number recovery off your important accounts, as described in the section above.
  4. Keep a separate number for account recovery if a service insists on one: a number you never give out is harder to target than the one on your business card. A second line may cost extra.
  5. Act on carrier alerts. A notice about a SIM change, eSIM transfer or port request you did not make is your earliest warning. Call the carrier immediately rather than waiting to see whether service drops.

The law: rules adopted, compliance deferred

United States. On 15 November 2023 the FCC adopted rules requiring wireless carriers to use secure methods to authenticate a customer before moving their number to a new SIM or a new carrier, to notify customers immediately of SIM change and port-out requests, to offer customers account locks that block SIM changes and ports, to train staff on SIM swap fraud, and to keep records of SIM change requests. The rules were published in the Federal Register on 8 December 2023. Carriers asked for more time. On 5 July 2024 the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau refused their request to delay compliance to March 2025, but synchronised all the deadlines so that none of the rules has to be complied with until the Office of Management and Budget finishes its paperwork review and the Commission publishes a compliance date in the Federal Register. As of November 2026 the regulation text for both SIM changes and port-outs still says compliance is not required until a compliance date is set. The major carriers offer locks voluntarily in the meantime.

Prosecutions. SIM swapping is prosecuted as fraud and identity theft. Three US cases show the range:

  • 2019: Joel Ortiz, a Boston college student prosecuted in Santa Clara County, California, accepted a 10-year sentence for SIM swap thefts of cryptocurrency. It was reported at the time as the first US sentence for SIM hijacking.
  • May 2025: Eric Council Jr. was sentenced to 14 months in federal prison for the SIM swap behind the SEC X account hack, after pleading guilty in February 2025 to conspiracy to commit aggravated identity theft and access device fraud.
  • August 2025: Noah Urban of Florida was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison and ordered to pay about $13 million in restitution for SIM swap thefts of cryptocurrency.

The cases show the methods in practice: fake IDs presented in stores, and crews that split the work of swapping the number and draining the accounts.

Verdict

A SIM swap works because accounts trust a phone number as proof of identity, and carriers can be talked, paid or logged into moving that number. When it happens, call the carrier from another phone first, secure email and money accounts while the number is being restored, then lock the carrier account. The lasting fix is a carrier PIN with transfer locks, so the number is harder to move, and accounts that no longer accept SMS, so a moved number reaches far less.

Sources & further reading